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A Comparative Analysis of the Philosophical Views on the Existence of God and Evil.
The concept of evil and morality has been one of the most pivotal in the history of humanity. Evil is a moral concept covering all forms of pain, misfortunes and suffering. Morality, on the other hand, is a binary system of determining good and evil. Evil and morality traverse through philosophy, religion, governance, culture and to some extent science. Wars have been fought over differences in schools of thought concerning evil. For religion, the concept is even more crucial. Many traditional religions believe in an omnipotent, omniscient and perfectly moral deity. This being said, the concept of evil has always threatened the collapse of religions that believe in such a god. Epicurious raised the “unanswered” question that questioned the concurrent existence of such a god and evil within the same reality ADDIN CSL_CITATION {“citationItems”:[{“id”:”ITEM-1″,”itemData”:{“DOI”:”10.1017/S0034412509990369″,”ISSN”:”00344125″,”abstract”:”This paper develops a challenge to theism. The challenge is to explain why the hypothesis that there exists an omnipotent, omniscient and all-good god should be considered significantly more reasonable than the hypothesis that there exists an omnipotent, omniscient and all-evil god. Theists typically dismiss the evil-god hypothesis out of hand because of the problem of good – there is surely too much good in the world for it to be the creation of such a being. But then why doesn’t the problem of evil provide equally good grounds for dismissing belief in a good god? I develop this evil-god challenge in detail, anticipate several replies, and correct errors made in earlier discussions of the problem of good. Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2010.”,”author”:[{“dropping-particle”:””,”family”:”Law”,”given”:”Stephen”,”non-dropping-particle”:””,”parse-names”:false,”suffix”:””}],”container-title”:”Religious Studies”,”id”:”ITEM-1″,”issue”:”3″,”issued”:{“date-parts”:[[“2010″,”9″]]},”page”:”353-373″,”publisher”:”Cambridge University Press”,”title”:”The evil-god challenge”,”type”:”article”,”volume”:”46″},”uris”:[“http://www.mendeley.com/documents/?uuid=5a27d49a-7deb-34cf-aa56-5ef99c03fefc”]}],”mendeley”:{“formattedCitation”:”(Law)”,”plainTextFormattedCitation”:”(Law)”,”previouslyFormattedCitation”:”(Law)”},”properties”:{“noteIndex”:0},”schema”:”https://github.com/citation-style-language/schema/raw/master/csl-citation.json”}(Law). Many arguments have been raised throughout the years to explain or to dispute the existence of god. In this brief review, the beliefs of Hume, Kant, James and Augustine are discussed in contrast and comparison to one another.
David Hume was a Scottish philosopher in the 1700s. In his writings, Dialogues, Humes considered Epicrious’s question and raises many views concerning it. He argues not from the view of an atheist but as a sceptic. He considers all the unnecessary forms of evil within our reality in the juxtaposition of a provident God. He challenges the view held by some that perhaps what we consider as evil is just apparent evil or “evil” whose eventuality will lead to good. Hume reasons out that the human’s view of morality and evil is determined by how his mind perceives reality and not by any philosophical arguments. Therefore, such a philosophical belief, that evil does not exist, cannot be a fathomable reality for an individual. Hume questions the provident God he believes in. He wonders why such a God would not provide fully for his creation despite his infinite ability to do so. Hume does not see the presence of evil as evidence for the absence of a god. Instead, he sees that we not only have no reason to argue for his existence but we also have none to dispute it. Overall, Hume believes that unnecessary evil exists concurrently with God. He also believes that God exists, is all-powerful, can end and prevent evil but chooses not to ADDIN CSL_CITATION {“citationItems”:[{“id”:”ITEM-1″,”itemData”:{“DOI”:”10.1017/S0031819114000229″,”ISSN”:”1469817X”,”abstract”:”The problem of evil for theists was how to reconcile suffering with a benevolent God. Hume solved the problem of evil by claiming that the divine was amoral but not by denying God’s existence which he needed in order to advocate his favoured notion of a general providence. Indeed, Hume’s treatment of the problem of evil showed that his quarrel in the Natural History of Religion 1and the Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, 2 Section XI, was with a particular providence rather than the possibility of a divine orderer. The fundamental problem of evil for Hume, was evil’s potential to drive people to the notion of a particular providence with its attendant damaging passions. In considering his alternative of the general providence Hume is shown to be closer to theism than has often been thought.”,”author”:[{“dropping-particle”:””,”family”:”Tarrant”,”given”:”James”,”non-dropping-particle”:””,”parse-names”:false,”suffix”:””}],”container-title”:”Philosophy”,”id”:”ITEM-1″,”issue”:”4″,”issued”:{“date-parts”:[[“2014″,”10″,”17″]]},”page”:”603-620″,”publisher”:”Cambridge University Press”,”title”:”Hume’s fundamental problem of evil”,”type”:”article”,”volume”:”89″},”uris”:[“http://www.mendeley.com/documents/?uuid=52e8a7e3-456e-35f0-9676-c18e2e016808″]}],”mendeley”:{“formattedCitation”:”(Tarrant)”,”plainTextFormattedCitation”:”(Tarrant)”,”previouslyFormattedCitation”:”(Tarrant)”},”properties”:{“noteIndex”:0},”schema”:”https://github.com/citation-style-language/schema/raw/master/csl-citation.json”}(Tarrant).
On the other hand, Kant (an 18th-century metaphysical philosopher) offers a non-theistic view of evil. He claims that humans have free will and can be inclined to do either good or evil. He views evil as a “stain” in the human will and classifies it in degrees of severity. He starts with those who are not necessarily corrupted by evil but are too weak to do what is morally right. He then goes on to describe the impure who do good but fueled by impure intentions and ends with those that have a fully evil will. He explains that this last category of individuals converts what is morally right to self-serving interests. Kant’s views have been disputed by many philosophers because his view does not necessarily explain natural evils nor heinous morally wrong acts ADDIN CSL_CITATION {“citationItems”:[{“id”:”ITEM-1″,”itemData”:{“DOI”:”10.1080/09608788.2012.718860″,”ISSN”:”09608788″,”abstract”:”Kant proclaimed that all theodicies must fail in On the Miscarriage of All Philosophical Trials in Theodicy, but it is mysterious why he did so since he had developed a theodicy of his own during the critical period. In this paper, I offer an explanation of why Kant thought theodicies necessarily fail. In his theodicy, as well as in some of his works in ethics, Kant explained moral evil as resulting from unavoidable limitations in human beings. God could not create finite beings without such limitations and so could not have created humans that were not prone to committing immoral acts. However, the work of Carl Christian Eberhard Schmid showed Kant that given his own beliefs about freedom and the nature of responsibility one could not account for moral evil in this way without tacitly denying that human beings were responsible for their actions. This result is significant not only because it explains an otherwise puzzling shift in Kant’s philosophy of religion, but also because it shows that the theodicy essay provides powerful evidence that Kant’s thinking about moral evil and freedom underwent fundamental shifts between early works such as the Groundwork and later works like the Religion within the Limits of Mere Reason. © 2012 Taylor & Francis Group, LLC.”,”author”:[{“dropping-particle”:””,”family”:”Duncan”,”given”:”Sam”,”non-dropping-particle”:””,”parse-names”:false,”suffix”:””}],”container-title”:”British Journal for the History of Philosophy”,”id”:”ITEM-1″,”issue”:”5″,”issued”:{“date-parts”:[[“2012″,”9″,”1″]]},”page”:”973-991″,”publisher”:” Routledge “,”title”:”Moral evil, freedom and the goodness of god: Why kant abandoned theodicy”,”type”:”article-journal”,”volume”:”20″},”uris”:[“http://www.mendeley.com/documents/?uuid=be59283e-30f1-3fcd-87d8-ef6c845aad52″]}],”mendeley”:{“formattedCitation”:”(Duncan)”,”plainTextFormattedCitation”:”(Duncan)”,”previouslyFormattedCitation”:”(Duncan)”},”properties”:{“noteIndex”:0},”schema”:”https://github.com/citation-style-language/schema/raw/master/csl-citation.json”}(Duncan).
Augustine, a Christian philosopher, confesses his struggle with the origin of evil in his writings (Confessions). He goes through a journey of trying to balance out the paradox of the existence of God and evil all at once. Early on he reconciled the two by shedding his belief in God’s omnipotence. If God is not omnipotent, then he cannot stop evil. He then rejects this notion and comes to view evil not as a created entity on its own but distorted good. He further rationalizes this though by explaining that all that is created by God is inherently good, but at varying levels. Therefore, when morally evil acts occur, it is because of a corruption of the inherent good in a person and not an evil caused or allowed by God. He believes that the choice to do evil is based on the free will which God gave to humans ADDIN CSL_CITATION {“citationItems”:[{“id”:”ITEM-1″,”itemData”:{“DOI”:”10.1017/S0034412513000401″,”ISSN”:”00344125″,”abstract”:”The question of why humanity first chose to sin is an extension to the problem of evil to which the free-will defence does not easily apply. In De libero arbitrio and elsewhere Augustine argues that as an instance of evil, the fall is necessarily inexplicable. In this article, I identify the problems with this response and attempt to construct an alternative based on Peter van Inwagen’s free will ‘mysterianism’. I will argue that the origin of evil is inexplicable not because it is an instance of evil, but because it is an instance of free will. © 2013 Cambridge University Press.”,”author”:[{“dropping-particle”:””,”family”:”Willows”,”given”:”Adam M.”,”non-dropping-particle”:””,”parse-names”:false,”suffix”:””}],”container-title”:”Religious Studies”,”id”:”ITEM-1″,”issue”:”2″,”issued”:{“date-parts”:[[“2014″]]},”page”:”255-269″,”publisher”:”Cambridge University Press”,”title”:”Augustine, the origin of evil, and the mystery of free will”,”type”:”article-journal”,”volume”:”50″},”uris”:[“http://www.mendeley.com/documents/?uuid=0d814966-edd1-3e13-92ed-32bd1116caa0″]}],”mendeley”:{“formattedCitation”:”(Willows)”,”plainTextFormattedCitation”:”(Willows)”,”previouslyFormattedCitation”:”(Willows)”},”properties”:{“noteIndex”:0},”schema”:”https://github.com/citation-style-language/schema/raw/master/csl-citation.json”}(Willows).
Lastly, the 19th-century pragmatic philosopher William James. From his writings, James did not believe in an omnipotent, omniscient and perfectly moral God. He instead viewed God as a being in the metaphysical realm whose knowledge has bounds and leaves humans to dictate their actions without the foreknowledge of what they might choose. Concerning evil and morality, James, unlike the three other philosophers, abandons the binary confines of good and evil. He proposes a pragmatic school of thought concerning morality. He sees morality as an intuition built through experiences in life. The societal norms within which one is raised determine their inner sense of right and wrong. Good and evil. A pragmatic society does not set morally right and wrong laws but rather considers the additive value of a series of moral action and chooses those which offer the least friction ADDIN CSL_CITATION {“citationItems”:[{“id”:”ITEM-1″,”itemData”:{“DOI”:”10.1017/S0025727300005457″,”ISSN”:”09505571″,”abstract”:”William James is often described as one of America’s foremost philosophers and the founder of American psychology. During the second half of the nineteenth century and the first decade of the twentieth century he published several key texts on a broad range of topics, including the psychology of religion, ethics, epistemology and metaphysics. Many are still in current use, and contemporary philosophers continue to pore over them. Biographers, meanwhile, happily speculate on everything from James’s parental relationships to the state of his marriage. However, there has been relatively little detailed exploration of how James’s published writings and his private life may have intersected. This article explores one such intersection: that between James’s protracted experience of ill health and the elaboration of the notion of evil in his writings. Any perusal, however perfunctory, of the thousands of letters written by James that are still in existence, cannot fail to miss his repeated references to his health, or lack of it. He certainly was not one to suffer in silence, and it is clear that, for much of his life from his early adulthood onward, he considered himself a confirmed invalid. His references to his health cover a variety of different ailments. In the 1860s, when James was in his twenties, he was plagued by everything from a bad back, to melancholy and constipation. These symptoms have not escaped the attention of his biographers; most, however, have brought to them Freudian-inspired schema. Daniel Bjork, for example, suggests that James’s ongoing problems with back pain had something to do with the unfulfilled sexual urges of a young man. He reminds us that once James was married, few such back complaints continued. 1 Similarly, Howard Feinstein ‘explains’ James’s constipation with reference to psychoanalytic theory, calling attention to the same condition suffered by his brother Henry, the novelist. According to Feinstein, the two brothers found it difficult to sever their suffocatingly close fraternal bond-an event that was reminiscent of their original ‘separation crisis’ from their parents. That ordeal, moreover, is held to be inherently linked to the brothers’ acquisition of sphincter control for the first time. Thus we should not be surprised that a later fraternal separation crisis was accompanied by a symbolic re-enactment of this bowel control process which manifested itself as constipation, concludes Feinstein. 2″,”author”:[{“dropping-particle”:””,”family”:”Sutton”,”given”:”Emma K.”,”non-dropping-particle”:””,”parse-names”:false,”suffix”:””}],”container-title”:”Medical History”,”id”:”ITEM-1″,”issue”:”3″,”issued”:{“date-parts”:[[“2011″]]},”page”:”389-392″,”publisher”:”Cambridge University Press”,”title”:”When misery and metaphysics collide: William James on ‘the problem of evil'”,”type”:”article-journal”,”volume”:”55″},”uris”:[“http://www.mendeley.com/documents/?uuid=49082bdb-24c4-3cbf-89d4-33e9b7b4f2ba”]}],”mendeley”:{“formattedCitation”:”(Sutton)”,”plainTextFormattedCitation”:”(Sutton)”,”previouslyFormattedCitation”:”(Sutton)”},”properties”:{“noteIndex”:0},”schema”:”https://github.com/citation-style-language/schema/raw/master/csl-citation.json”}(Sutton).
In my subjective opinion, God, to be a sovereign creator and one in control of the physical world has to be all-powerful, all-knowing and good in every sense. The existence of evil in such a reality is best explained by Augustine’s school of thought since it allows the existence of such a God in this harsh reality. The only shortcoming would be that Augustine’s rationale does not explain the reasons for the existence of natural evil under the reign of such a God. Objectively, James’ beliefs have a much better fit within our reality. Since God is not all-powerful, evil, a separate force within the metaphysical realm can exist and cause sheer unnecessary harm within the world.
Works Cited
ADDIN Mendeley Bibliography CSL_BIBLIOGRAPHY Duncan, Sam. “Moral Evil, Freedom and the Goodness of God: Why Kant Abandoned Theodicy.” British Journal for the History of Philosophy, vol. 20, no. 5, Routledge , Sept. 2012, pp. 973–91, doi:10.1080/09608788.2012.718860.
Law, Stephen. “The Evil-God Challenge.” Religious Studies, vol. 46, no. 3, Cambridge University Press, Sept. 2010, pp. 353–73, doi:10.1017/S0034412509990369.
Sutton, Emma K. “When Misery and Metaphysics Collide: William James on ‘the Problem of Evil.’” Medical History, vol. 55, no. 3, Cambridge University Press, 2011, pp. 389–92, doi:10.1017/S0025727300005457.
Tarrant, James. “Hume’s Fundamental Problem of Evil.” Philosophy, vol. 89, no. 4, Cambridge University Press, 17 Oct. 2014, pp. 603–20, doi:10.1017/S0031819114000229.
Willows, Adam M. “Augustine, the Origin of Evil, and the Mystery of Free Will.” Religious Studies, vol. 50, no. 2, Cambridge University Press, 2014, pp. 255–69, doi:10.1017/S0034412513000401.
